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Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of
Physician Inquiry
Robert Gatter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the most unflattering portraits of medical care, physicians
dehumanize patients.' They attend to the illness but not to the ill
person; they separate the physiology of the disease from the experience
of suffering. 2 Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilyich is a classic example.
Ilyich's physicians treat his medical condition but ignore everything
else about him.
To Ivan Ilyich only one question mattered: was his condition serious
or not? But the doctor ignored this inappropriate question. From his
point of view it was an idle question and not worth considering. One
simply had to weigh the alternatives: a floating kidney, chronic
catarrh, or a disease of the caecum. It was not a matter of Ivan Ilyich's
life but 3a conflict between a floating kidney and a disease of the
caecum.

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. This Article could not have been written without the dedicated research assistance
of Anthony McClure and Bruno Tarabichi. I am grateful to both for lending their considerable
talents to this project. The thesis presented here was originally developed during a fellowship at
the Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota. I thank the faculty and staff of the Center for
their financial, administrative, and scholarly assistance. In particular, I thank Jeffrey P. Kahn, the
Center's director, and Susan M. Wolf, who oversaw my fellowship research. The Article's arguments were further developed as a result of a presentation to and comments from the faculty of
the Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank the Chicago-Kent faculty for its support of my scholarship. In particular, I am grateful to Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Richard W. Wright for their invaluable suggestions.
1. See, e.g., LEO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH (Bantam Classic Editions 1981); see
also Eric Cassell, The Changing Concept of the Ideal Physician, 115 DAEDALUS 185, 188 (1986).
Cassell writes that modem medicine does "not deal effectively with individuals, value-laden objects, things that change over time, or wholes that are greater than the sum of their parts." Id.
2. See Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 77, 111-12 (1993).
3. TOLSTOY, supra note 1, at 75.
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In such an impersonal medical world, a patient's medical condition
becomes the patient's complete identity. One's diagnosis is his dog tag,
such as "the coronary in Room 41.",
Although this brand of medicine is almost universally condemned,5
informed consent law 6 surprisingly invites it. Informed consent law
requires physicians to consider nothing more than a patient's medical
condition when disclosing information about treatment options.7 Thus,
it permits physicians to ignore non-medical characteristics in the
informed consent process, including in particular, the treatment goals of
patients. This standard exists despite the fact that the informed consent
doctrine is intended to facilitate a patient's autonomous medical
8
decision-making.
Under the informed consent doctrine, physicians are obligated to
provide each patient with information necessary to enable the patient to
make an intelligent decision about whether to undergo a recommended
procedure, consent to an alternative treatment option, or refuse
treatment altogether.9 Whether a physician's disclosure is adequate is
determined by one of two legal standards, each of which requires
physicians to learn some information about each patient to whom
disclosures will be made.' 0 With this information, physicians then
determine what knowledge is necessary for the patient to make an
informed treatment decision.1 1 Consequently, as part of their duty to
educate patients about pending treatment decisions, physicians have a
prior obligation to educate themselves about each patient. 2 Although
such a legal rule has the potential to personalize medical decision4. Rich, supra note 2, at 112 (quoting CECILIA M. ROBERTS, DOCTOR AND PATIENT IN THE
TEACHING HOSPITAL 48-51 (1977)).
5. See id. at 110-12 and accompanying citations (asserting that physicians who focus their attention on the physiology of illness, instead of the "phenomenology," are less effective and cause
greater suffering to their patients).
6. For an overview of the informed consent doctrine and its importance in both ethics and law,
see PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
7. See infra Part III.A (discussing the majority position under informed consent law).
8. See KATZ, supra note 6, at 59.
9. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 35-65; Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman,
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 630 (1970) (discussing the physician's
duty to disclose information about collateral risks and not to proceed with treatment unless the
patient accepts the risks).
10. See infra Part II.B (discussing the two legal standards under informed consent law).
11. See infra Part I.B (discussing the disclosure standards).
12. See infra Part II (discussing the implicit subjectivity inherent within informed consent
standards).
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making, that potential is as of yet unrealized because most courts and
some legislatures have interpreted the rule to require nothing more than
an assessment of each patient's medical circumstances. 13 Under this
interpretation, all coronary patients considering bypass surgery receive
the same treatment information: a one-size-fits-all disclosure regime
where disclosures are tailored to the diagnosis, not to the patient.
This Article argues that the law has forgotten about a physician's
duty to get to know his or her patients as a prerequisite to adequate
informed consent. Courts take for granted that this duty is met in the
course of a medical history and exam.14 But in order to meet the goal of
autonomous medical decision-making, informed consent law must
extend the physician's duty to require that he or she makes a reasonable
inquiry into the treatment goals of each patient. Only then can
physicians adequately sort material from immaterial treatment
information and present material information to patients in ways that
truly enable patients to make choices that reflect their preferences.15
At the same time, the law must not interpret the duty of physician
inquiry too broadly. 16 As important as the principle of patient
autonomy may be, it must be balanced against other competing
interests, such as maintaining an efficient health care delivery system
that does not unnecessarily spend valuable clinical time on learning a
patient's every idiosyncrasy. 17 In other words, while current law
enforces a standard of inquiry that is too depersonalized, the law can
also overcompensate by enforcing a standard that is so personalized as
to be inefficient. This Article proposes that a duty for physicians to
reasonably inquire into the treatment goals of each patient strikes an
appropriate balance between the need for autonomy and the need for
clinical efficiency.18

13. See infra Part III (outlining the scope of a physician's duty to inquire into a patient's circumstances).
14. See infra Part III.A (discussing the majority position on the scope of physician inquiry).
15. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that patient autonomy in medical decision-making is thwarted
where the law permits physicians to inform patients based upon false assumptions about patients'
treatment goals).
16. See infra Part IV.B-C (discussing the importance of balancing the interest in patient
autonomy with the interests of fairness to physicians and clinical efficiency).
17. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-05 (1994)
(observing that much of the discussion about informed consent is unproductive because commentators speak exclusively from the perspective of either a proponent of patient autonomy or a
proponent of clinical efficiency).
18. See infra Part IV.C (identifying the efficiencies that could result from requiring physicians
to inquire into the treatment goals of each patient they propose to treat).
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Moreover, the expansion of managed care makes the reinterpretation
of physicians' duties under informed consent law more urgent. 19 A
policy of lowering the cost of medical care through service limitations
underlies and explains the rise of managed care in this country.2 ° At the
same time, managed care policies have increased public distrust of the
institution of medicine. 21 Physicians, as never before, have divided
loyalties. They serve not only the interests of patients they treat, but
also the interests of all members of a patient's managed care insurance
pool by conserving the funds that make up that shared pool. 22 Although
a legal duty for physicians to reasonably inquire about the treatment
goals of each patient cannot alone restore public faith in the medical
system, it can promote greater loyalty between physician and patient in
a system that attempts to protect patient autonomy without wasting
23
precious resources.
Part II of this Article outlines informed consent law and shows that,
within the logic of the doctrine's disclosure standards, there exists a
24
duty for physicians to inquire about each particular patient's goals.
Part III reviews the current scope of the duty of inquiry, finding that the
majority of courts require physicians to discover only the medical
circumstances of each patient they propose to treat. 25 Part III also
presents a handful of cases showing the shortcomings of such a narrow
interpretation. 26 Part IV refines and justifies a duty for physicians to
reasonably inquire into each patient's treatment goals, striking a balance
between the need for greater patient autonomy and the need for fairness

19. See Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care, 35
Hous. L. REV. 1631, 1631 (1999) (reinterpreting informed consent in light of managed health
care).
20. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing managed care's concern with
containing costs and increasing profitability).
21. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (detailing the drop in public trust in the
health care system and the public's inherent need to trust its health care system).
22. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (describing doctors' dichotomous roles as
both patient advocates and medical resource protectors).
23. See infra Part IV.E (asserting that increased physician inquiry will contribute to increasing
the public's trust in its health care system).
24. See infra Part II (discussing the informed consent standards and the implicit duty within
each standard for physicians to inquire into patients' medical conditions).
25. See infra Part IH.A (discussing the majority interpretation of informed consent law, which
requires physicians to inquire into patients' medical conditions only).
26. See infra Part II.B (discussing the minority interpretation of informed consent law, which
requires physicians to inquire into a patient's non-medical circumstances in addition to understanding the patients' medical conditions).
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and clinical efficiency. 27 Lastly, Part28IV places the duty of inquiry into
the practical context of managed care.

II.

SUBJECTIVITY IN THE OBJECTIVE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS OF
INFORMED CONSENT LAW

At its core, the legal doctrine of informed consent requires that
physicians inform patients about the nature and risks of proposed
treatments and prohibits physicians from treating any patient without
that patient's consent.29 The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the
patient. It is founded upon a policy
of promoting bodily integrity and
30
self-determination among patients.
A. Causes of Action Under Informed Consent Law
The doctrine of informed consent provides patients with two causes
of action against a treating physician: one for providing treatment
without any consent, and another for failing to sufficiently disclose

27. See infra Part IV (discussing the extension of physicians' duties under informed consent
law and the justifications for such an extension).
28. See infra Part IV.E (placing the extension of physicians' duties under informed consent
law into the context of managed care).
29. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 13-14. The literature on informed consent law is
too vast to list here. For an in-depth analysis of the entire doctrine, see id. at 35-129; KATZ, supra note 6, at 48-84; Schuck, supra note 17, at 920-941; Symposium, Perspectives on J.Katz,
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1987). For recent analyses
of applications of the legal doctrine, see Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed
Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1079,
1081-98; Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed Consent: Computers and the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 1019, 1032-41 (1998); Wolf, supra
note 19, at 1650-65.
30. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). The now
famous line from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Schloendorff makes this clear: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body." Id. The United States Supreme Court has also observed that the common law doctrine of
informed consent protects the interest persons have in preserving bodily integrity by avoiding
medical batteries. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724-26 (1997) (discussing the
Court's holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health). There is significant debate about the extent to which the legal doctrine sufficiently advances its founding principles.
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 6, at 48-84. Little doubt exists, however, that the legal doctrine not
only purports to protect patients from unwanted medical treatment, but that it has actually
achieved the enhancement of patient autonomy in medical decision-making. As Professor Susan
M. Wolf recently wrote, "though commentators have noted.., a gap between the aspirational
doctrine and clinical reality, it is safe to say that no physician would feel free to inflict invasive
treatment on a nonconsenting patient again as in Schloendorff." Wolf, supra note 19, at 1633
(citation omitted).
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treatment information to allow for truly informed consent. 3 1 The first
cause of action permits patients to sue for receiving medical treatments
to which they did not consent. 32 This form of informed consent case is
rare today, and it generally arises when a physician's actions exceed the
scope of the patient's consent. 33 Because the second cause of action is
much more common, it provides the focus of discussion for this Article.
In addition, a physician's duty to inquire about a patient's
34
characteristics arises from this second cause of action.
The second cause of action allows patients to sue for injuries caused
by a physician's failure to disclose relevant information about a
proposed treatment prior to the patient's consent. Typically, a patient
alleges that the physician failed to inform the patient of a treatment risk
or alternative treatments before the patient consented to the treatment
that led to an injury. 35 The patient alleges that the physician is liable for
the patient's injury because the patient would have refused the treatment
(and thus avoided injury) had the physician informed the patient of the
undisclosed risk or treatment alternative. To plead a claim for failure to
disclose treatment information, a patient must allege that: (1) the
physician had a duty to disclose the particular information; (2) the
physician breached this duty; and (3) the physician's breach caused an
36
injury to the patient.
31. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 114-16 (outlining various causes of action in tort
relating to informed consent).
32. See, e.g., Roberson v. Provident House, 576 So. 2d 992, 994 (La. 1991) (holding that inserting an indwelling catheter over the express objection of the patient constitutes a nonconsensual invasion of the patient's body and, thus, is a battery).
33. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
surgeon who transfused a patient with blood from a source other than the patient's family members committed battery despite the patient's consent to receive blood on the condition that one of
her immediate family members be the source of the blood).
34. See infra Part II.B (discussing an implied duty to inquire in both the reasonable person
standard and prudent physician standard).
35. See, e.g., Hezeau v. Pendleton Methodist Mem'l Hosp., 715 So. 2d 756, 758 (La. Ct. App.
1998) (concerning a physician's failure to disclose the risk of infection during knee surgery where
the risk materialized); Caputa v. Antiles, 686 A.2d 356, 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(concerning a physician's failure to disclose an alternative to surgery for treating the patient's
condition). It is possible for one set of facts to give rise to a cause of action for failure to disclose
treatment information and for treating without a patient's consent. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Schiller,
445 S.E.2d 153, 154 (Va. 1994) (concerning a physician's use of forceps in the delivery of a patient's child without informing the patient of any risks associated with the use of forceps and
without obtaining the patient's prior consent).
36. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (R.I. 1972). The causation element has
two sub-elements known as decision-causation and injury-causation. See APPELBAUM ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 119-23. To allege decision-causation, the patient must plead that the physician's
breach caused the patient to consent to treatment that the patient otherwise would have refused.
See, e.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 676 (Haw. 1995). In almost all jurisdictions, the patient
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B.

Standardsof Disclosure

Courts apply two distinct standards of care to measure the sufficiency
of physicians' disclosures in informed consent cases. 37 While both are
"objective" standards, they each employ a subjective component. 38 To
comply with the informed consent treatment disclosure rules, physicians
must assess and account for at least some subjective circumstances of
each patient they treat.39 Part III argues that this duty to assess and
account for subjective characteristics of patients is interpreted by the
majority of courts to require only that physicians account for each
patient's medical condition in the course of informing patients about
their treatment options.
1. Reasonable Person Standard
About half of the jurisdictions in this country employ a reasonable
person standard to determine whether a physician has a duty to disclose
particular treatment information under the first element of a failure-todisclose claim. 40 Under this standard, a physician must disclose
information that "a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach

must allege that a reasonable person in the patient's position would not consent to the treatment at
issue if the person knew about the information not disclosed to the patient. See id. at 675. To
allege injury-causation, the patient must allege that an injury resulted from the treatment. See
APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 119. The elements listed above presume that the cause of
action arises under a theory of negligence, as it does in most jurisdictions. But an informed consent claim based on the physician's failure to adequately inform a patient of the risks associated
with treatment can, in at least one jurisdiction, result in battery. See, e.g., Gouse v. Cassel, 615
A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1992). Such a claim does not include the decision-causation element. Instead, the physician is liable for any damages resulting from the treatment once it is determined
that the physician breached the duty to disclose. See id.
37. See infra Part II.B.I-2 (discussing the reasonable person standard and the prudent physician standard).
38. See infra Part II.B.I-2 (discussing the implicit subjective component within informed consent standards).
39. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that a physician's proper disclosure of the risks that a reasonable person in the patient's position would find
significant in deciding whether to submit to a proposed treatment depends on the physician's understanding of the patient's medical history and any other relevant factors about the patient's
condition); see also ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERs 52 (1981) ("By adding the phrase, 'or should know,' [the reasonable person disclosure standard] further implies that the physician is under some obligation to inquire into factors
that might make the present patient's informational needs different from those of the average patient.").
40. See Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 696 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); see also Laurent B.
Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform
Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1008, 1012 (1978) (using the phrase "professional medical standard" to describe a physician's standard of care).
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significance to . .. in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy." 4 1 On its face, the reasonable person standard demands that
physicians first assess the patient's position and then decide what a
reasonable person in that same position would want to know to make
the treatment decision. Thus, the rule places a burden squarely on a
physician's shoulders to determine the "position" of each patient he or
she proposes to treat. 42 This determination is the necessary starting
place of the rule.43
The burden of determining the patient's position presupposes a duty
44
for physicians to perform an affirmative inquiry about each patient.
The rule places the reasonable person "in what the physician.., should
know to be the patient's position." 45 These words impose a duty on
physicians to achieve some minimal understanding about each patient's
circumstances before determining what information to disclose to the
patient. 46 Thus, physicians have a duty to educate themselves about
each patient that is embedded within the physician's duty to educate
each patient about pending treatment decisions.
Moreover, the inquiry contemplated under the reasonable person
disclosure rule is a subjective one 47 that, at least rhetorically, has been
described so broadly as to include not only each patient's medical
characteristics, but also each patient's "idiosyncrasies and religious
beliefs ....
"48
Waltz and Scheuneman, the original authors of the
standard, described the "patient's position" as including the "particular
49
patient's background, present circumstances and prognosis."
41. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra note 9, at 640).
42. The original authors of the reasonable person standard made clear that they intended "the
patient's position" to refer to the particular patient. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 9, at
639-40.
43. See Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1548 ("[T]he crucial language in the above formulation is 'what
the physician [knew] or should [have known] to be the patient's position."') (quoting Crain v.
Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. App. 1982)).
44. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 9, at 639-40 (explaining that the reasonable person
standard places a burden on physicians to inquire about patients).
45. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (emphasis added).
46. See Redford v. United States, 1992 WL 84898, at *10 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that a patient's physician failed to adequately inform the patient about her treatment options in part because the physician failed to adequately inquire about the patient's complaints); see also ROSOFF,
supra note 39, at 52.
47. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing physicians' duty to make an
affirmative inquiry about each patient in order to determine what information to disclose to the
patient).
48. Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985) (interpreting the "patient's position" as
it appears in Alabama's standard for decision causation).
49. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 9, at 640.
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include a
Similarly, a few courts have described the patient's position to
50
characteristics.
patient
non-medical
wide range of medical and
In addition to requiring physicians to assess the subjective
characteristics and circumstances of the particular patient, the
reasonable person standard also demands that the physician tailor
treatment disclosures to account for those subjective features. 5 1 It does
so by directing physicians to transplant the subjective features that
constitute the patient's "position" onto the otherwise faceless reasonable
person. 52 Under the rule, the objective reasonable person stands-at
least partially-in the shoes of the subjective patient. Only from the
perspective of such a "subjectified" reasonable person may physicians
assess the value of treatment information to the patient's treatment
decision. 53 Thus, the reasonable person disclosure standard is neither
completely objective nor completely subjective; it is a hybrid,
combining both objective and subjective standards into one rule.

50. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The 'patient's position'
must include the patient's medical history and other factors that might make knowledge of certain
risks particularly important to a certain patient, acting reasonably."); Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1155
("[Tihe objective standard [of decision-causation] requires consideration by the fact finder of...
").
all of the characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs ....
51. See Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1549 (stating that the reasonable person disclosure rule requires a
physician to disclose a 0.1 to 0.3% risk that a sterilization procedure would not prevent future
pregnancy so as to account for the physician's actual knowledge that the plaintiff had a tremendous fear of becoming pregnant due to a past ectopic pregnancy and a warning from another physician that she might not survive a future pregnancy); Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding a physician liable for failing to disclose that foot surgery could
never enable the patient to wear high-heeled shoes again where the physician knew that this was
the purpose for which the patient sought treatment).
52. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable person standard).
53. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized that the objective decision-causation standard of
informed consent, which employs the construct of the "reasonable person in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position," is a "subjectified" objective standard. Fain,
479 So. 2d at 1155. That court wrote:
This standard is based on what a reasonable person in the patient's position would have
done had risk information been disclosed. What a reasonable person would agree to
depends in large measure on the facts and surrounding circumstances of an individual
case. The standard reflects the view that obtaining consent must be accomplished on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the peculiar needs and concerns of each patient ....We note ... that the objective standard requires consideration by the fact
finder of what a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs, would have done under the same circumstances.
Id. (quoting FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, 62-63 (1984));
see also Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 675 (Haw. 1995) (interpreting the reasonable person decision-causation standard). Oddly, despite the use of the exact same phrase in the reasonable person disclosure standard, courts have not as clearly recognized the subjective component in the
otherwise objective disclosure rules as some have in the context of decision-causation.
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2. Prudent Physician Standard
Some states employ the prudent physician standard rather than the
reasonable person standard. 54 The prudent physician standard requires
physicians to disclose information that a reasonably prudent physician
in the same or similar circumstances would disclose. 55 Unlike the
reasonable person standard, the prudent physician standard does not
expressly require physicians to account for each patient's position in
56
determining the value of disclosing treatment information.
Nonetheless, the prudent physician standard can be interpreted to
accommodate subjective patient characteristics and to impose an
implicit duty of inquiry on physicians.
Like the reasonable person standard, the prudent physician standard
is not purely objective. The prudent physician standard qualifies its
objective component with the inclusion of contextual features of the real
circumstances faced by the physician. 57 When determining what
information to disclose to a patient, a physician must first assess the
relevant "circumstances" into which the hypothetical, prudent physician
will be placed. Moreover, those particular circumstances include at
least the medical characteristics of the particular patient the physician is
examining. 5 8 Only then can a physician assess what a prudent physician
would do in those circumstances. Indeed, it would be absurd to ask
whether a prudent physician would disclose the possibility of enrolling
a patient in an experimental trial of a new drug without first explaining
the circumstance in which the issue arises. The prudent physician
would first want to know about the patient's medical
circumstances-such as the patient's diagnosis, prognosis and treatment
history-and perhaps some non-medical circumstances, including
whether the patient is pursuing a cure or seeks to improve the quality of
what life the patient has left. Only then would the prudent physician be
prepared to determine what should or should not be disclosed.
Although the language of the rule does not explicitly mandate this
subjective inquiry, the cases applying the rule have implicitly mandated
it. For example, the holdings in failure-to-disclose cases where the
54. See, e.g., Fain, 479 So.2d at 1152.
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See Frantz, supra note 40, at 1020-44 (comparing the reasonable person standard with the
prudent physician standard).
57. The prudent physician standard requires physicians to disclose information that a reasonably prudent physician, in the same or similar circumstances, would disclose. See id. at 1028.
58. See, e.g., Shabinaw v. Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1189-1192 (Idaho 1998) (in determining
what a prudent physician would disclose to a patient, the court implicitly held that the relevant
circumstances include patient's suspected diagnosis, which was "a total bowel obstruction").
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prudent physician standard was applied reveal that patients'
59
circumstances were treated as the only relevant circumstances.
Moreover, even if some courts did not interpret the word
"circumstances" under the prudent physician standard to include patient
characteristics, the breadth of that term allows for all subjective patient
characteristics to fall within it. Because the prudent physician standard
has been interpreted to account for subjective patient characteristics, it
logically follows that it also imposes a duty on physicians to inquire
about those characteristics.
C. Summary of the Disclosure Standards
A critical point follows from a plain reading of the two disclosure
standards commonly used in informed consent law: both standards
require physicians to inquire about some subjective characteristics of
their patients before determining what must be disclosed to each patient.
The reasonable person standard is relatively explicit. It states that there
is information about "the patient's position" that a treating physician
"should know." 6 Thus, unless the physician already knows that
information, the physician is obliged to seek it out. While the prudent
physician standard does not expressly require that patient characteristics
be accounted for, it requires physicians to identify relevant
"circumstances" in which to place a hypothetical, prudent physician so
as to determine what must be disclosed to a patient. 6' Courts, in turn,
have implicitly interpreted those "circumstances" to include at least
some characteristics of the patient.
Although both standards of informed consent law impose upon
physicians the duty to consider subjective patient circumstances, neither
standard fully defines the scope of a physician's duty to actively inquire
into a patient's subjective characteristics as a prerequisite to informing
the patient about impending treatment decisions. The next part of this
Article reviews the courts' applications of the "objective" disclosure
standards, and concludes that the interpretation of the duty to inquire
into patients' subjective circumstances is overly narrow.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO INQUIRE UNDER CURRENT LAW
Despite their rhetoric about enabling autonomous treatment
decisions, courts generally impose a very narrow duty on physicians to
59.
tient's
60.
61.

See infra note 89 (providing examples of cases in which courts implicitly rule that the pacircumstances make up the relevant circumstances).
See supra Part II.B. I (discussing the reasonable person standard).
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the prudent physician standard).
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inquire into a patient's subjective needs for treatment information. 62
The majority of courts require a physician to ascertain only a patient's
medical condition, proposed treatment, or sometimes both, in order to
adequately determine what must be disclosed to that patient.
Accordingly, the law generally permits physicians to remain ignorant of
a patient's non-medical characteristics despite the relevance of those
characteristics in providing useful treatment information to each patient.
So, for example, under the majority approach, a physician may disclose
the same information to every patient with colon cancer even if one
patient's primary goal is to participate in his daughter's wedding rather
than to maximize his chances for a cure. The physician is permitted to
assume that the patient's goal is to maximize his chances of cure, and,
therefore, the physician satisfies the duty of disclosure without
explaining the likelihood that any of the patient's treatment choices will
achieve the patient's goal.
A few cases, however, applied a broader interpretation of what nonmedical characteristics physicians must account for in providing
treatment information to patients. 6 3 Although these cases have not
provided exact definitions or exemplary lists regarding characteristics
physicians must discover about their patients as part of the duty to
disclose, they have provided a basis from which to formulate a duty of
physician inquiry that is of appropriate scope.
A. The Majority Position
Relying solely on how some courts and commentators have defined
the "patient's position," one might believe that informed consent law
requires physicians to get to know their patients very well. According
to Professor Fay Rozovsky, physicians must assess each patient "not
only medically but also, to a degree, from a social or personal
perspective," 64 including each patient's "needs and wants. 65 One
federal court of appeals wrote that "[t]he 'patient's position' must
include the patient's medical history and other factors that might make
knowledge of certain risks particularly important to a certain patient,
acting reasonably." 66 The Supreme Court of Alabama, considering
identical language in the decision-causation element of a failure-to-

62. See infra Part ILI.A (discussing the majority position).
63. See infra Part ILI.B (discussing a minority interpretation of the non-medical circumstances
physicians should consider when disclosing treatment information).
64. FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.11.2 (1984).
65. See id.
66. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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disclose claim, wrote that a reasonable person in the patient's position is
"a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff,
including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs . ..-61 Most courts,
however, have applied the law much differently, making the above
language sound like hollow rhetoric. These courts require much less of
physicians, equating the "patient's position" or the relevant
"circumstances" with the patient's medical condition, a proposed
treatment or both. 68 Consequently, courts do not impose any obligation
on physicians to inquire into patient's treatment goals and, instead,
permit physicians to base their treatment disclosures on what the
physicians assume their patients want.
The clearest example of such an interpretation comes from a case
recently decided by the Washington Court of Appeals. In Bush v.
Stack69 the court held that a physician was entitled to disclose treatment
information to a patient based on the physician's untested assumption
about the patient's medical symptoms and the pain about which the
patient complained. 7" The plaintiff-patient suffered from a curvature in
his penis and sought treatment from the defendant-physician.
According to the patient, his treatment goal had been to reduce the pain
that his wife experienced during sexual intercourse caused by the way
his penis came into contact with her episiotomy scar.7 1 While the
patient revealed to the physician that his wife experienced pain during
intercourse, he did not specify that the pain was associated with his
wife's episiotomy scar. 72 Likewise, the physician did not ask any
follow-up questions about the patient's complaint.7 3 Rather, the
physician assumed that the pain was caused by the degree of the
74
curvature only.
Based on this assumption, the physician recommended a procedure to
surgically reduce the curvature. 75 The patient consented to and
underwent the recommended procedure. 76 Later, the patient sued the
".

67. Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985); see also Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667,
671-72 (Haw. 1995).
68. See infra notes 69-97 and accompanying text (describing cases in which courts required
physicians to learn nothing more about their patients than each patient's medical circumstances).
69. Bush v. Stack, No. 41817-3-I, 1999 WL 364120 (Wash. Ct. App. June 7, 1999).
70. See id. at *2.
71. See id. at *1.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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physician for breaching the duty of disclosure under Washington's
informed consent law, which employs the reasonable person standard of
disclosure. 77 The patient claimed that the physician was obligated to
inquire about the nature of his wife's discomfort and to disclose that the
recommended procedure was unlikely to relieve that discomfort. 78 The
court held that the physician was entitled to rely on his untested
understanding of the patient's complaint and that, unless the patient told
the physician that his wife's scar was a source of the pain, the physician
did not have a duty to disclose that the procedure was unlikely to reduce

79
pain caused by the episiotomy scar.

Thus, the court in Bush held that a physician need not attempt to
discover anything about a "patient's position" once the physician
identifies the medical condition that the patient presents to the
physician. The court reached this conclusion without considering the
likelihood that a physician will draw an erroneous assumption about a
patient's treatment goals from such a limited understanding of the
patient's position and that the physician will misinform the patient as a
result. In addition, the court failed to consider the relative ease with
which the physician could have tested his assumptions about the
patient's goal by asking some follow-up questions concerning the nature
of the pain being experienced by the patient's wife.
While not as clear an example as Bush, the California Supreme
Court's opinion in Arato v. Avedon 80 is, nonetheless, another instructive
example of how courts generally require physicians to discover and
account for only patient's medical circumstances as physicians
determine what treatment information to disclose to patients. In Arato,
the survivors of a patient who died of pancreatic cancer sued the
patient's physician, arguing that the physician failed to disclose the high
mortality rate of patients with pancreatic cancer. 81 According to the
plaintiffs, had the decedent been informed that his chances of survival
were statistically bleak, he would have managed his business affairs
very differently so as to be prepared for death.8 2 Employing the
reasonable person standard of disclosure, 83 the California Supreme
77. See id. at *2.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
81. See id. at 600-02.
82. See id. at 602. Instead, Mr. Arato underwent an unproven course of therapy. See id.
Meanwhile, his contracting business failed, leading to substantial financial losses after his death.
See id.
83. See id. at 607.
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Court held that the standard did not require physicians "to disclose
every contingency that might affect the patient's nonmedical 'rights and
interests."' 84 Thus, the opinion indirectly defined the scope of the
physician's duty to ascertain the patient's position as a duty to include
only the patient's medical position. 85 The court thereby relieved
physicians of the burden
of learning anything about patients' non86
medical characteristics.
In contrast to Bush and Arato, other decisions do not address, either
directly or indirectly, the requirement that physicians assess the
subjective characteristics of their patients, even though the rhetoric of
the disclosure rules appears to demand it. 87 Accordingly, one must infer
from holdings, dicta or other clues how courts interpret the scope of a
88
physician's duty to inquire about patients' subjective characteristics.
Courts often equate the "patient's position" and the relevant
"circumstances" from the respective disclosure standards with the
patient's medical condition, proposed treatment, or both. 89
A

84. Id. at 608-09.
85. See id. at 608-09.
86. See id.
87. See supra Part II.B (discussing the logical implication that the disclosure standards impose
a duty upon physicians to inquire about the subjective characteristics of their patients).
88. In many instances it was impossible to draw any reliable inferences from reported opinions. See, e.g., Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa 1987); Elkins
v. Key, 702 So. 2d 57, 59-61 (La. Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, the trends described below are
based upon those cases from which some reliable inference can be drawn.
89. For examples of cases in which courts equate the "patient's position" from the reasonable
person disclosure standard with the patient's medical condition, see Hezeau v. Pendleton Methodist Mem'l Hosp., 715 So. 2d 756, 762 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a lower court finding that
the risk of infection during knee surgery is a risk about which a reasonable person in the patient's
position would want to know, where the only facts presented about the plaintiff concerned his
medical history and condition); Caputa v. Antiles, 686 A.2d 356, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (holding that "[a] patient with no fever, only partial obstruction of one kidney, intermittent
pain, and who vomited only once without question would desire to be informed not only of the
option of surgery, but also of the much less intrusive alternative ....
");Metzler v. Dichraff, 570
N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished opinion, available in 1997 WL 370036 July 8,
1997) (concluding that an issue of fact exists about whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
position would have considered material information about the availability of specialists to perform a third molar extraction, when the only factual information reported about the plaintiff was
that she had an impacted third molar). For examples of cases in which courts equate "patient's
position" with the proposed treatment, see Kain v. United States, No. Civ. A. 93-2466, 1994 WL
71261, at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. March 9, 1994) (finding that the risk of a hernia associated with the
surgical removal of the gallbladder is not material based only upon evidence concerning the likelihood and seriousness of the risk for patients undergoing the same surgery); Finnegan v. Yamour, No. 715, 1990 WL 119244, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1990) (noting that testimony that
a patient undergoing the kind of surgery performed on the plaintiff should be informed of risks of
hemorrhage, infection, and difficulty in healing was sufficient to support a jury finding that the
plaintiff had been informed of all material risks). For examples of cases in which courts imply
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Wisconsin case, Johnson v. Kokemoor,9° provides a prototypical
example of a case from which one can infer that the court interprets
"patient's position" to mean the patient's medical condition. In that
case, a patient sued a neurosurgeon for failing to disclose his surgical
inexperience, the increase in the morbidity and mortality risks for the
involved procedure when performed by inexperienced physicians, and
the availability of more experienced surgeons. 9 1 The patient prevailed
at trial, and the physician appealed, arguing that physicians are obliged
92
only to disclose information about treatments-not about themselves.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the duty to disclose treatment

that one is in the patient's position when one is suffering from the same medical condition and
considering the same treatment, see Wachter v. United States, 877 F.2d 257, 258-61 (4th Cir.
1989) (stating that the patient's position included having a clogged coronary artery despite prior
bypass surgery and considering whether to undergo a second bypass procedure). Interestingly,
the court explained that the patient was uncommonly self-educated about her condition and the
available alternatives, but that this did not factor into the court's assessment of the duty to disclose. See id. at 258. Other cases implying that one is in the patient's position when one is suffering from the same medical condition and considering the same treatment include: Ellis v.
Smith, 528 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 659 N.E.2d 506 (Ind.
1995) (describing the key issue as "the reasonable disclosure and informed consent necessary for
elective foot surgery on a muscular dystrophy patient..."); Rowinsky v. Sperling, 681 A.2d 785,
789-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting that evidence on the record that plaintiff suffered from grand
mal seizures originating in the left temporal lobe of his brain and that brain surgery to remove the
damaged section of the brain had been recommended was sufficient to support the jury's finding
that a reasonable person in the patient's position would have wanted to know the risk that memory or speech abilities could be lost).
For examples of cases equating the "prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances"
with the prudent physician informing a patient with the same medical condition as that of the actual patient, or the prudent physician informing a patient about the same treatment as had been
proposed for the actual patient or both, see Shepard v. United States, No. CV-S-87-736-PMP
(RJJ), 1989 WL 248215, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 19, 1989) (implying that a prudent physician in the
same or similar circumstances is one advising a patient about the bone graft surgery performed on
the plaintiff); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 913 (Colo. 1982) (defining the prudent physician
rule to require disclosure of risks that are "medically significant to the patient's surgical decision.. .") (emphasis added); Shabinaw v. Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1189-1192 (Idaho 1998) (in
overturning trial court's grant of JNOV against a physician, the state supreme court reviewed the
expert testimony concerning standards for disclosure, including testimony describing the relevant
circumstances as treating a patient in whom the physician "suspected a total bowel obstruction,"
and decided that there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict); Wecker v. Amend, 918
P.2d 658, 660, 662 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (determining that the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury that the duty of disclosure includes disclosing treatment alternatives, where the
evidence included expert testimony that watchful waiting is a viable medical alternative for patients with potentially cancerous cervical warts).
90. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
91. See id. at 497. The brain operation left the plaintiff a quadriplegic. See id. at 498-99. The
court found that the defendant had overstated his experience with this type of surgery. See id. at
499.
92. See id. at 504. It was undisputed that the defendant had warned the patient about all possible medical side effects. See id.
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information includes a duty to disclose physician-specific risk
information. 93 In so holding, the court ruled that a reasonable person in
the patient's position would want to know the physician-specific
information at issue in this case. 94 Yet the only factual information
mentioned by the court concerning the patient's circumstances was that
she suffered from a bifurcated, basilar aneurysm for which neurosurgery
had been recommended.9 5 Thus, the court impliedly held that a
"reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be
the patient's position" 96 means, in this case, a reasonable person with a
bifurcated, basilar aneurysm for which neurosurgery had been
recommended. Stated as a general rule, the court implied that
physicians adequately understand a "patient's position" for the purpose
of disclosing treatment information when they identify a patient's
diagnosis and, perhaps, a treatment option. Accordingly, the court
97
required no inquiry into any non-medical characteristics of the patient.
Indeed, such a narrow interpretation of the scope of the physician's
duty to learn about each patient has even been codified in at least two
states.98 The Louisiana and Texas state statutes significantly narrow
the reasonable person standard of disclosure by requiring only that
physicians identify a proposed treatment for each of their patients in
order to know what treatment information to disclose. 99 Texas and
Louisiana use Medical Disclosure Panels staffed by physicians and
lawyers to identify all medical treatments for which physicians must
disclose risks.'l° The Panels determine and publish a list of the precise
risks that must be disclosed for each treatment. 1 1 Moreover, any
93. See id. at 498.
94. See id. at 505.
95. See id. at 499.
96. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra note 9, at 1407-10).
97. See Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 505.
98. See 18 La. Reg. 1391-1401 (Dec. 20, 1992); 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601.2 (West 1999).
99. See Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988) (employing reasonable
person standard); Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1983) (employing reasonable
person standard); see also 18 La. Reg. 1391-1401 (limiting information that must be disclosed);
25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601.2 (specifying information that must be disclosed).
100. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40E (West 2000); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 45901, § 6.04 (West Supp. 2000) (providing for the creation of medical disclosure panels).
101. See 18 La. Reg. 1391-1401; 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601.2 (1999). For example, Texas
identifies the risks of blood transfusions as follows:
(1) Transfusion of blood and blood components.
A.
Fever.
B.
Transfusion reaction which may include kidney failure or anemia.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 31

physician who discloses the codified treatment risks associated with a
particular procedure is rewarded under the 02statutes of both states with a
legal presumption that consent is effective. 1
Thus, under a majority interpretation of informed consent law,
physicians need not do any more than identify a patient's medical
circumstances as a prerequisite to educating patients about their
treatment options. As a result, physicians may ignore all non-medical
characteristics of patients. As argued in Part IV, such an interpretation
is not only impersonal, it undermines patient autonomy in medical
03
decision-making. 1
B. The Minority Position
A few jurisdictions have departed from the majority interpretation
and read the "objective" disclosure rules to require physicians to
account for more than patient's medical conditions. 10 4 Although these

C.
Heart failure.
D.
Hepatitis.
E.
AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome).
F.
Other infections.
25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601.2(h)(1). Such disclosure lists are published in each state's administrative code together with a disclosure and consent form to be used by physicians. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40E(3)(a); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 4590i, § 6.07(a)(1) (West
Supp.2000).
102. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40E(7)(a)(i) (creating a presumption of effective
consent after a physician provides disclosure list); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 4590i, §
6.07(a)(1) (creating presumption of effective consent after a physician provides disclosure list).
103. See infra Part IV.A (justifying a duty for physicians to reasonably inquire into individual
patients' treatment goals, relying on the principle of respect for patient autonomy).
104. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lugenbuhl v.
Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602, 606 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206,
1210 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. Ct. App. 1977). Although
the cases reviewed in this sub-section all arise in jurisdictions applying the reasonable person disclosure standard, there is evidence that some courts in jurisdictions employing the prudent physician standard of disclosure have interpreted that standard to include non-medical circumstances.
In each of these cases, courts have permitted the emotional fragility of individual patients to limit
what or how disclosures are made under the prudent physician standard.
For example, in Tatro v. Lueken, 512 P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973), the Kansas Supreme Court ruled
on a failure-to-disclose claim involving a woman who suffered a vesicovaginal fistula as a result
of a hysterectomy. See id. at 532. She claimed that her physician was obligated to disclose the
risk of such a fistula under the state's informed consent law. See id. Having lost at trial, the patient appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by submitting the claim to the jury rather than
directing a verdict for the plaintiff based on the physician's admission that he had not disclosed
the risk of a fistula to the patient. See id. at 531. In dicta, the court held that the physician's duty
to disclose under a prudent physician standard does not require disclosure of information when
such disclosure "would endanger the recovery of the patient because of his existing physical or
mental condition .... " Id. at 537. The court reasoned that the scope of disclosure under the circumstances was properly submitted to the jury because there was evidence on the record that the
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cases document the injustice that results when physicians ignore the
non-medical interests of their patients, most involve physicians having
actual knowledge of some unique characteristics of their patients.
Accordingly, because these cases hold a physician accountable for
failing to act upon knowledge of a patient's non-medical characteristics,
rather than for failing to inquire about these characteristics, they do not
explicitly expand the scope of the physicians duty to inquire. One
unpublished opinion, however, did apply a broad interpretation of an
objective rule to physicians who failed to discover the subjective
treatment goals of their patient. 10 5 Indeed, it may be the only case in
which physicians were liable under an informed consent theory for
failing to adequately educate themselves about their patient.
Of the cases in which physicians failed to account for known, nonmedical characteristics of their patients when informing them of
treatment options, Hartke v. McKelway 10 6 most clearly tied informed
consent liability to the physician's failure to adequately account for the
non-medical circumstances of the patient. 10 7 In Hartke, a patient
underwent a procedure designed to sterilize her. 10 8 When she later
became pregnant, she sued her former physician on the grounds that he
failed to disclose to her that there was a 0.1 to 0.3 percent chance of
pregnancy despite the procedure. 1°9 A jury verdict was returned for the
patient's fragile emotional condition justified withholding the risk of a fistula. See id. In so
holding, the court adopted the rule that "'[t]he nature and extent of the disclosure [under informed
consent law] depends upon the medical problem as well as upon the patient. It has been suggested that some disclosures may so disturb the patient that they serve as hindrances to needed
treatment .... ' Id. at 538 (quoting 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 154); see also
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (describing the problem of a physician's
presenting too many risks and thus alarming the patient). Thus, courts have interpreted the "same
or similar circumstances" language in the prudent physician disclosure standard to include both a
patients' medical and emotional conditions to the extent that courts have incorporated a therapeutic privilege exception into the duty to disclose. Other courts have expressly interpreted the prudent physician standard to require physicians to assess the "mental state" of their patients. See,
e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 420 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas law and finding the physician justified in failing to inform the patient that another examining physician had found the
patient an unsuitable candidate for surgery).
105. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Redford v. United
States, Civ. A. No. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898 (D. D.C. April 10, 1992) (unpublished
opinion).
106. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
107. See id. at 1549 (finding that a reasonable person with what the physician knew to be the
patient's fear of pregnancy "would be likely to attach significance" to the undisclosed risk of future pregnancies despite a sterilizing procedure).
108. See id. at 1547.
109. See id. The patient and her boyfriend both testified that the physician told them that the
procedure was a "100 percent sure" operation. See id. Had they known otherwise, the patient
and her boyfriend testified that the boyfriend would have undergone a vasectomy in order to
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plaintiff, and the physician appealed. One issue on appeal was whether
the physician violated his duty of disclosure by not revealing such a
small risk. l1 0 The court held that the record supported the jury's verdict
that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have
considered even a small risk of pregnancy significant to her decision
about undergoing the treatment. 111
In so holding, the court expressly recognized that determining the
"patient's position" is the starting place in duty to disclose analysis and
that the inquiry into the "patient's position" encompasses more than just
the patient's medical condition. In the application of the reasonable
person standard, the court paid special attention to the language of the
standard regarding what the "physician [knew] or should [have known]
to be the patient's position." 1 12 The court reasoned that the patient's
position must include information of the "patient's medical history and
other factors that might make knowledge of certain risks particularly
important to a certain patient, acting reasonably." 11 3 In applying this
interpretation of the reasonable person standard, the court noted that
plaintiff was unusually frightened by the prospect of pregnancy because
she had a history of gynecological problems, including an ectopic
pregnancy, and because she had been told by another physician that she
would not survive additional pregnancies. 114 The physician knew of the
patient's fears at the time he disclosed treatment risks to the patient, yet
he failed to adequately account for what he knew about the patient in his
disclosures. 115 As a result, the court concluded that the physician
breached his duty to disclose information that a reasonable person, in
what he knew to be the patient's position, would want to know. 116
Hartke is valuable in two respects. First, it recognized that an
assessment of each patient's subjective characteristics and
circumstances is the logical starting place of an otherwise objective
disclosure standard.' 17 Second, it defined that assessment to include not
only a patient's medical circumstances (diagnosis, prognosis, medical

avoid future pregnancies. See id.
110. See id. at 1546.
111. See id. at 1549. The patient had a history of traumatic gynecological problems prior to
undergoing sterilization, and she thought that she would die from any future pregnancy. See id.
112. Id. at1548.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1548-49.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1549.
117. See supra Part II.B (discussing the implicit duty to consider the patient's subjective circumstances when providing disclosures).
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history, etc.), but also other non-medical circumstances, such as this
patient's unique fear that a pregnancy threatened her life." 8 Thus,
Hartke interpreted the reasonable person standard to compel the
physician to account for both medical and non-medical features of the
patient's circumstances at the time the physician is determining what to
disclose to the patient.
Other courts have also held that physicians must account for unique
medical and non-medical features of their patients when disclosing
treatment information. 119 Like Hartke, these cases involve physicians
who actually knew about some unique medical or non-medical
information about their patient at the time treatment information was
disclosed. For example, one physician knew that the patient's purpose
in seeking treatment of foot pain was to comfortably wear high-heeled
shoes again. 120 Another physician knew that the patient wanted surgical
mesh to be used to repair a reoccurring hernia. 121 Finally, in a case
similar to Hartke, the physician knew that the patient sought
sterilization so as to avoid the danger future pregnancies placed on her
strain additional children would
physical well-being and the financial
22
place on her family's well-being.1
These cases, however, stand for a limited proposition. They hold
that, in determining what treatment information to disclose to a patient,
a physician must account for every patient characteristic about which
the physician has actual knowledge regardless of whether the physician
was required to have discovered those characteristics. Accordingly,
these cases do not redefine the scope of the physician's duty to discover,
or even inquire about, non-medical characteristics of patients. In each
of these cases, the physician already knew about (and also disregarded)
the patient's unique characteristics at the time the physicians determined
what treatment information was material to each patient. 123 Therefore,

118. See Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1548-49.
119. See Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602. 605 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Hartman v.
D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1018
(Md. 1977).
120. See Hartman, 665 So. 2d at 1207-08. The plaintiff underwent foot surgery to remove
bunions and corns from her toe and to address other causes of her foot pain. See id. at 1207.
121. See Lugenbuhl, 676 So. 2d at 605. Ten years earlier, the plaintiff had experienced three
unsuccessful operations to repair a different hernia before surgical mesh had been used. See id. at
604. Therefore, he requested the use of surgical mesh to repair the hernia at issue in this case.
See id. He sued when the physician failed to use the mesh and the hernia reoccurred. See id.
122. See Sard, 379A.2dat 1018.
123. See supra notes 104-22 and accompanying text (discussing cases where physicians knew
about and disregarded non-medical characteristics of their patients when providing treatment information).
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to interpret the holdings of these cases to require physicians to inquire
about non-medical characteristics of their patients before presenting
treatment information is to misconstrue and overextend them. Indeed,
such an interpretation blurs the distinction made in the reasonable
person standard between what a physician knows and what a physician
124
should know to be the patient's position.
Another case, Redford v. United States,125 more directly addressed
the duty of physicians to inquire into the medical and non-medical
characteristics of their patients. The court in Redford held that two
Army physicians breached their duties of disclosure when they failed to
disclose to a patient considering a hysterectomy that other procedures
126
could effectively treat the patient's pelvic pain without sterilizing her.
Unlike Hartke, Redford involved an instance in which a physician failed
to inquire about a patient's treatment goals and instead based his
disclosures on an assumption about what the patient hoped to achieve.
Accordingly, it provides one example in which a court ruled that a
physician has a duty to inquire about a patient's treatment goals in
addition to discovering the patient's medical condition.
The patient in Redford sought treatment for infertility, pelvic pain,
and vaginal bleeding and discharge. 127 One of the physicians she
consulted was an Army surgeon to whom she had been referred for a
hysterectomy when her pain, bleeding and discharge grew worse despite
treatment. The surgeon agreed that a hysterectomy was appropriate
based on the symptoms described by the referring physician and records
kept by the referring physician about earlier meetings with the
patient. 128 The surgeon did not know that, in addition to seeking relief
from her pain, bleeding and discharge, the patient wished to remain
fertile. The patient had told this to the referring physician when they
had first met, 129 but she did not tell the surgeon. The referring
physician had forgotten about the patient's wish to have another baby,
and his records did not reflect this goal either. 130 Moreover, the surgeon
124. The reasonable person standard expressly distinguishes between patient information the
physician actually knows and that which the physician should know. See Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a physician must disclose what "a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position" would deem significant) (emphasis added).
125. Redford v. United States, Civ. A. No. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898 (D. D.C. April
10, 1992).
126. See id. at *10-*13.
127. See id. at *2-*3.
128. See id. at *6.
129. See id. at *3.
130. See id. at *4.
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did not inquire about the patient's treatment goals. 131 Lacking key
information about the patient, the physician failed to disclose that
alternative procedures existed for treating the patient's symptoms
without sterilizing her. Consequently, the patient consented to and
underwent the hysterectomy based on her incorrect assumption that her
32
condition required a sterilizing procedure. 1
The patient sued both the referring physician and the surgeon for
failure to obtain her informed consent, claiming that both doctors
breached a duty to disclose that the hysterectomy was not necessary.
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that both
doctors failed to adequately account for the plaintiff's goal of remaining
fertile when they made their treatment recommendations and disclosed
133
treatment information to the patient.
Most instructive is that the court found the surgeon liable for failing
to account for the patient's goal of retaining her ability to become
pregnant. Unlike the referring physician, the surgeon did not know that
the patient wanted to retain her ability to become pregnant.
Nonetheless, the court found the surgeon to have breached a duty to
account for the patient's desire to remain fertile when the surgeon made
his treatment disclosures. 34 Thus, the court's holding with respect to
the surgeon must mean that the surgeon had a duty to inquire about the
patient's treatment goal rather than act on the basis of assumed goals
drawn only from the patient's medical symptoms. Accordingly,
Redford provides precedent, at least in part, for the rule that physicians
not only have a duty to inquire about a patient's medical condition but
also to inquire about some non-medical characteristics of the patient,
including the patient's treatment goals.

IV.

DEFINING AND JUSTIFYING A DUTY OF REASONABLE INQUIRY INTO
THE SUBJECTIVE TREATMENT GOALS OF EACH PATIENT

Defining a physician's duty as including an obligation to learn about
the medical and non-medical characteristics and circumstances of the
patient, as exemplified in Redford, allows one to formulate a rule of
inquiry for informed consent law that is of proper scope. The informed
consent doctrine should be expanded to require physicians to make a
reasonable inquiry into the subjective treatment goals of each patient
they propose to treat. This expansion would allow physicians to tailor
131.
132.
133.
134.

See
See
See
See

id. at *6.
id. at *7.
id. at *13.
id.
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treatment information to a particular patient, and thus, it would be more
consistent with the concept of patient autonomy that underlies the
informed consent doctrine. 135 This expansion would also assure that
the treatment information disclosed to each patient is formulated around
a reasonable understanding of the purpose for which each patient seeks
treatment.
Such a duty, however, must also strike an appropriate balance
between achieving greater patient autonomy in medical decisionmaking and assuring an efficient system in which medical care is
provided. As argued in detail below, the duty of reasonable inquiry
136
would likely improve clinical efficiency in the long run.
Nonetheless, there are some exceptional cases in which this duty would
not meaningfully improve patient autonomy and would be merely a
waste of clinical time. Those are cases in which there is almost no risk
that a physician's assumption about a patient's treatment goals based
only on the patient's medical condition would make a difference in the
treatment received or the risks associated with the treatment.
Accordingly, the rule of reasonable inquiry should not apply to those
cases. 137
Additionally, the duty of reasonable inquiry into subjective treatment
goals is not unduly burdensome to physicians. 138 It does not require
physicians to account for every idiosyncrasy of each patient. Rather, it
is limited to a specific kind of information-a patient's treatment goals.
Moreover, the standard would require only that physicians make a
reasonable effort to determine those goals. Consequently, a duty of
reasonable inquiry into the subjective treatment goals of patients,
together with its exception for cases where there is little doubt of
treatment goals, would promote clinical efficiency. The rule, thus,
would minimize the potential for providing unnecessary care, while, at
the same time, it would also improve the understanding between patient
and physician. The resulting decrease in unnecessary care and
improvement in understanding between patient and physician would
lead to improved health among patients and greater patient satisfaction
and loyalty.

135. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that a duty of reasonable inquiry by physicians about patients' treatment goals promotes patient autonomy).
136. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the costs and benefits of informed consent).
137. See infra Part IV.D (outlining the circumstances in which the duty of reasonable inquiry
should not apply).
138. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the limits of reasonable inquiry).
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Finally, the time is right for the law to recognize the duty of
reasonable inquiry into patients' treatment goals. Efforts to lower the
cost of medical care provide incentives for physicians to under-utilize
medical care. 139 One effect of these incentives has been to diminish
public trust in the institution of medicine generally and in the medical
profession more specifically. By requiring physicians to inquire into
patients' treatment goals, the law can aid in restoring public trust in
medicine.
A. The Duty of Inquiry and the Goal of Autonomous Medical Decisions
The doctrine of informed consent is founded on a principle of
autonomy. 140 It is designed to give patients more control over their
medical decisions and their bodies. 14 1 Because one goal of informed
consent law is to increase patient autonomy, a rule requiring physicians
to inquire into the subjective treatment goals of each patient they
propose to treat would improve the foundation of informed consent law.
Indeed, any improvement in a physician's understanding of a particular
patient's interests will improve the likelihood that the physician's
disclosures will enable the patient to make a more autonomous
treatment choice. 142 In addition, such improved understanding will
make shared decision-making between patients and physicians more
feasible. 143
Most courts, however, have limited the scope of a physician's duty to
learning only a patient's medical circumstances. 144 Whether courts
139. See infra Part IV.E (arguing that the duty of reasonable inquiry can help repair the damage managed care has done to the public's trust in physicians).
140. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (identifying the promotion of bodily integrity
and self-determination for patients as the foundation of the informed consent doctrine).
141. See supra Part II (discussing the origin and purpose behind the doctrine of informed consent).
142. See Pam Lambert et al., The Values History: An Innovation in Surrogate Medical Decision-Making, 18 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 202 (1990); Ben A. Rich, The Values History: A New
Standardof Care, 40 EMORY L.J. 1109, 1152 (1991).
143. The term "shared decision-making" is used to mean a process of medical decisionmaking in which physicians actively assist patients to make treatment choices that reflect each
patient's values. Such a process is consistent with the principle of respect for patient autonomy
because it requires physicians to facilitate autonomous treatment choices by providing patients
with necessary medical information, assisting patients to identify their treatment goals, helping
patients identify how "risk averse" they are, and helping patients to understand how each treatment option might or might not serve the patient's goals or risk adversity. For further discussion
of shared medical decision-making, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of
the Physician-PatientRelationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2221-22 (1992); KATZ, supra note 6, at 85164.
144. See supra Part ILI.A (discussing the majority interpretation of the scope of a physician's
duty to inquire).
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define the relevant subjective circumstances to include only the
patient's diagnosis or, perhaps, proposed treatment, these definitions
frustrate the goal of autonomous medical decision-making because they
assume that all reasonable patients with a given diagnosis or treatment
option have the same informational needs.
For example, consider a hypothetical case of two patients with colon
cancer. 145 One patient's primary goal is to fully participate in his
daughter's wedding, which will take place in four months. His
secondary goal is to extend his life as long as possible. The other
patient has the primary goal of extending his life as long as possible
without regard to what that means for the patient's quality of life in the
short run. These patients need different information about their
treatment options as a result of their different treatment goals. Most
notably, the first patient needs to know which of his treatment options is
likely to leave him so weak or sick with side effects that he cannot
participate in his daughter's wedding. He also needs to know which of
the remaining treatment options is most likely to extend his life. The
other patient, concerned primarily with extending his life, needs only
information about the effectiveness of all treatment options. Yet, under
the majority interpretation of the disclosure standards, the first patient is
not entitled to the information he needs unless he discloses to the
physician his goal of dancing at his daughter's wedding. This is
because the law currently requires physicians to discover only the
medical conditions of patients they take through the informed consent
process. 146 Thus, in the eyes of the law, the two patients in our example
have the same informational needs because they each have colon
cancer. In other words, informed consent law ignores that people with
identical medical conditions find themselves in otherwise different
circumstances, which cause them to need different kinds of information
about their treatment options. Reasonable people in the same medical
circumstances are not necessarily in the same non-medical
circumstances. By ignoring this simple fact, the law's disclosure
requirements fall short of providing what patients need to make truly
informed treatment choices, and, as a result, they thwart the goal of
promoting autonomous medical decision-making.
Certainly, a patient's medical circumstances are relevant to the
formulation of useful disclosures. The problem is that a rule of law
requiring only the discovery and consideration of each patient's medical
145. See supra Part III (providing an example of two colon cancer patients).
146. See supra Part II.A (discussing the majority position that physicians need only discover
the medical conditions of patients).
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circumstances does not go far enough. Instead, it permits sweeping
assumptions about all people with a given medical condition.
Indeed, the majority view that the objective disclosure standards in
informed consent law need be subjectified only to the extent of
recognizing the patient's medical circumstances is similar to the
application of a reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment
cases. 147 Although the reasonable woman standard is an improvement
over using a purely objective reasonable person standard, it is not
subjective enough because it permits gross gender stereotyping. A
reasonable woman standard, used to determine if a work environment is
sexually hostile, assumes that all reasonable women are equally
sensitive to sexually harassing conduct. 148 Analogously, a "reasonable
person in the patient's medical position" standard or a "prudent
physician treating a patient in the same medical circumstances" standard
for informed consent law assumes that all reasonable people who have a
particular diagnosis or are considering the same treatment have identical
informational needs. To avoid such problematic assumptions and to
better serve the purpose of the informed consent doctrine, the law must
require that physicians discover and account for some non-medical
characteristics and circumstances of each patient they propose to treat.
Both Redford and Hartman provide good examples of the effect of
such sweeping assumptions. Each involved a patient who complained
of pain and, based on this complaint, each physician assumed that the
patient's only goal was to minimize or eliminate that pain. 149 In each
case, the assumption was inaccurate because it ignored a second goal
against which to balance the goal of minimizing pain.150 In both cases,

147. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying a reasonable woman standard in a sexual harassment claim); Harris v. International Paper
Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me. 1991) (adopting a "reasonable black person" standard).
148. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445,
473 (1997) (criticizing judges' perception of the reasonable woman as a "white, heterosexual,
upper-income, something of a moderate or liberal feminist, untroubled by intense religious feeling, and a little prissier than the reasonable person in reacting to office shenanigans"); see also
Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What Is It and How Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.?, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 385
(1994-95).
149. See Redford v. United States, No. Civ. A. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898, at *13 (D.
D.C. 1992) (holding liable the doctors who did not consider the patients' dual goals of reducing
pelvic pain and pregnancy); Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding the doctor responsible for failing to disclose information relevant to the patient's goal of
wearing high heels again).
150. See Redford, 1992 WL 84898, at *2-*3; Hartman, 665 So. 2d at 1207-08.
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the false assumptions led to incomplete disclosures and, in turn, to
uninformed and non-autonomous treatment decisions.151
To avoid making false assumptions about the informational needs of
patients, physicians must improve their understanding of each patient's
non-medical circumstances. This tenet is well supported in literature
that has criticized informed consent law for failing to achieve the goal
of patient autonomy. 152 The point, however, is not simply to require
physicians to gather all the non-medical information they can about
each patient. 153 Such a requirement pursues patient autonomy to the
exclusion of all other public interests including, for example, the
interest of clinical efficiency. 154 Therefore, the duty to inquire must be
limited to include a duty to gather only that information that is most
likely to provide the greatest enhancement of patient autonomy.
Accordingly, courts should not interpret the physician's obligation to
assess each "patient's position" as a duty to learn each patient's values,
emotional make-up and life interests. Instead, it should be interpreted
as a duty to inquire into the treatment goals of each patient.
The differences between Hartke and Redford illustrate the importance
of the balance between patient autonomy and clinical efficiency.
Although the Hartke court interpreted the patient's position to include
more than the medical circumstances of each patient, it likely went too
far. 155 It defined the patient's position to include all "factors that might
make knowledge of certain risks particularly important to a certain
patient, acting reasonably." 156 Arguably, this rule obligates physicians
to discover everything about each patient that might reveal a unique
informational need. Without any limitation, such a standard is too

151. See Redford, 1992 WL 84898, at *6-*7; Hartman, 665 So. 2d at 1207-08.
152. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 6, at 104-29 (discussing the struggle between rights and capacity when allowing a patient to make an autonomous decision); Rich, supra note 142, at 1141180 (discussing the development and enforcement of a value system governing the standard of
health care); Schuck, supra note 17, at 903-04 (criticizing the doctrine of informed consent).
153. See Rich, supra note 142, at 1155-56. Rich argues that the medical standard of care
should recognize a duty for physicians forming long-term relationships with patients to take a
"values history" of each patient, which might include a review of both written and oral advance
directives, as well as discussion of each patient's "attitude toward current health status, perception
of the role of personal physician and other caregivers, thoughts about independence and control,
overall attitude toward life, attitude toward illness, dying and death, religious background and
beliefs, recent living environment, and attitude concerning finances." Id. at 1155.
154. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the duty of reasonable inquiry would likely improve
clinical efficiency).
155. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 106-18
and accompanying text (discussing Hartke).
156. Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1548.
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157
broad, pursuing every marginal improvement in patient autonomy.
Redford, on the other hand, suggests a much more limited rule that is
focused on the need for physicians 1to
learn about one factor in
58
particular-the patient's treatment goals.
A rule of inquiry into each patient's treatment goals is most likely to
enhance patient autonomy in medical decision-making because a
treatment goal is the basis from which each patient assesses the value of
treatment options. Physicians cannot effectively assist patients in
making informed medical decisions without first understanding each
patient's treatment goals. To identify "material" treatment information,
a physician must know the purpose for which the information will be
used. Such a purpose serves as a basis against which to judge the
relative value of all available information. For example, in Hartman,
had the podiatrist used his knowledge about the patient's goal of
wearing high-heeled shoes to sort treatment information into the
categories of "material" and "non-material," he would have disclosed
the inability of the proposed surgery to enable the patient to ever wear
59
high-heeled shoes. 1

Rather than simply providing a list of treatment options together with
a generic description of risks and benefits, physicians could present
treatment choices in terms of their likelihood of achieving the patient's
particular goals. A duty of inquiry into treatment goals will not only
help physicians identify all material information for each patient but
will also prepare physicians to present that information in a way that
makes the most sense to each patient. For example, had the two
physicians in Redford understood the patient's treatment goal of
minimizing her pain while still preserving, if not enhancing, her ability
to become pregnant, they would have informed her that a hysterectomy
would resolve her symptoms but leave her sterile and that other options
existed to treat her symptoms without sterilizing her.160

157. For another example of an overly burdensome duty on physicians to get to know their
patients, see Rich, supra note 142, and the scope of Rich's proposed values history described at
supra note 153.
158. See Redford v. United States, No. Civ. A. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898, at *13 (D.
D.C. April 10, 1992) (holding that the doctors breached their duty to disclose treatment information because of their failure to inquire about and account for Redford's goal of becoming pregnant).
159. See Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding the doctor
responsible for failing to disclose information relevant to patient's goal of wearing high heels
again).
160. See Redford, 1992 WL 84898, at *13.
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B. Assuring Fairnessto Physicians
Although enhancing patient autonomy in medical decision-making is
a foundational goal of informed consent law, it is not the only goal. The
law must also be concerned that its rules are fair to physicians as well as
patients. Indeed, the concern for assuring fair disclosure rules to
physicians explains why physicians can be held liable for failing to
disclose information, but not for failing to get patients to understand the
disclosed information. 16 1 Likewise, it explains why all jurisdictions
employ objective limitations in their disclosure standards and why most
jurisdictions similarly limit the standard for decision-causation. 162 The
duty of physicians to inquire into the treatment goals of patients must
similarly assure fairness to physicians by placing an objective limitation
on the scope of the duty.
The key to making medical decisions autonomous is to assure that
patient and physician have a mutual understanding of the patient's
treatment goals. 163 If informed consent law's only purpose was to
promote patient autonomy, it would make physicians strictly liable for
64
failing to actually understand each patient's treatment goal.1
Enforcing a rule of understanding, however, would not only be
impractical,' 65 it would be unfair to physicians. Whether mutual
understanding results from communication between two or more people
is not under the control of any one participant in the conversation.
Rather, it is a product of a cooperative effort. 166 Thus, holding a
physician strictly liable for failing to achieve a mutual understanding
with a patient is, at least in part, punishing the physician for the conduct
of another. 167 Accordingly, the law must craft a rule capturing only the

161. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In duty-to-disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly upon the nature and
content of the physician's divulgence than the patient's understanding or consent. Adequate disclosure and informed consent are, of course, two sides of the same coin-the
former a sine qua non of the latter.
Id. at 780 n. 15.
162. See id. at 789-90.
163. For a thorough accounting of the importance of mutual understanding in informed consent, see FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 6, at 307-11.
164. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789-90 (discussing the objective limitations imposed upon
disclosure standards).
165. See id.
166. See JUrgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of PhilosophicalJustification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry
Weber Nicholsen trans., The MIT Press 1990).
167. But cf Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Wis. 1999) (holding that a patient can
be contributorily negligent in a failure-to-disclose case).
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physician's role in achieving a mutual understanding of the patient's
treatment goal. This is exactly what the rule of inquiry does. It does
not impose a duty of understanding on physicians; rather, it demands
only that physicians instigate a conversation designed to gather
information about each patient's treatment goals. Thus, a physician can
fulfill this duty even if a patient refuses to cooperate in the conversation
or the hoped-for understanding does not result in the physician's mind.
The rule of inquiry should also be limited by a standard of
reasonableness that only requires physicians to make a reasonable
inquiry into the subjective treatment goals of each patient. A physician
fulfills this duty when the physician makes at least the same effort that a
reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances would make in
order to understand what another person seeks to achieve from medical
treatment. 168 Of course, the question "what is your treatment goal" is
likely to be met with a confused stare. The following question is-more
likely to elicit information relevant to the patient's treatment goals: how
is your condition affecting your home life, your work, and your major
activities outside of work or home? Such a question goes beyond the
obvious-that patients want to "get better"-and seeks to understand
how the medical condition diminishes the quality of the particular
patient's daily life.
Additionally, the reasonable inquiry defined above demands more
than a single question because a reasonable person seeking to
understand what another hopes to achieve from medical treatment
would likely ask follow-up questions that probe the patient's initial
answer for greater clarity. Accordingly, physicians will be required to
do the same. A duty to ask reasonable follow-up questions would have
changed the outcome in Bush v. Stack because this is precisely what the
physician in that case failed to do. 169 The patient told Dr. Stack that the
patient's wife experienced pain during intercourse, and, rather than
following up with questions concerning the nature of the pain, Dr. Stack
assumed that the pain was only caused by the curvature in the patient's
penis. Had Dr. Stack asked for a description of the pain or its
frequency, the patient would have likely responded with information
that would have either directly or indirectly revealed Dr. Stack's
assumption as false.
168. The distinction between the reasonable person standard and the prudent physician standard is an important one. The standard for the reasonable inquiry should be based upon a reasonable person because the process of attempting to understand the motives of another through
communication is one in which lay persons can also engage. It is certainly not a uniquely medical process and, thus, a prudent physician standard is inappropriate.
169. See supra notes 69-79 and the accompanying text (discussing Bush v. Stack).
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The reasonableness standard, on the other hand, also protects
physicians from having to endlessly probe patients for more information
about their treatment goals. Some patients may not know exactly what
they hope to achieve or may have difficulty articulating it. Others may
misunderstand their physician's questions or may resist defining their
purposes. Without an objective limitation to a physician's inquiry,
physicians could be held liable for failing to ask the one question that,
in hindsight, would have brought forth key information about the
patient's treatment goals.

C. ClinicalEfficiency and the Benefits of the Rule
of Reasonable Inquiry
Standing in tension with informed consent law's goal to enhance
patient autonomy in medical decision-making is its interest in not
overburdening the system of health care delivery. 170 The more that
informed consent standards respond to the subjective interests of
patients, the more clinical time they demand of physicians and other
health care professionals. This, in turn, increases the costs of health
care delivery. In other words, there is a trade-off between the benefit of
greater autonomy and the clinical costs of achieving it. Neither
opponents nor proponents of more subjectively responsive informed
consent laws can ignore this. Just as it makes no sense to achieve
greater clinical efficiency through eliminating the rights of patients to
consent to treatments, it makes no more sense to achieve fully
autonomous medical decision-making by bankrupting the health care
delivery system. The law must strike an appropriate balance.
Accordingly, this proposal to recognize a duty of reasonable inquiry
under informed consent law standards must account for its likely effect
on clinical efficiency. The duty of reasonable inquiry would at a
minimum require physicians or other health care professionals to spend
additional clinical time on informed consent. Nonetheless, the duty is
likely to result in a net increase in clinical efficiency. As more fully
developed in this section, the duty of reasonable inquiry will lower the
likelihood of unnecessary care, improve patient compliance with
treatment plans, and lower the risk of patient lawsuits by providing
patients with more personalized treatment.

170. See Schuck, supra note 17, at 903-905 (arguing that two camps exist in the informed
consent debate-those who argue that every advancement in decision-making autonomy for patients is worth making and those who argue that patient autonomy must yield to the realities of
clinical medicine).
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Under the current informed consent law, a physician need only spend
the time necessary to assess the medical circumstances of each patient
before the physician is prepared, in the eyes of the law, to determine
what treatment information a reasonable person in that medical
circumstance would want to know to make the treatment decision at
hand. 17 1 If the duty of reasonable inquiry were imposed, physicians or
other clinical personnel would spend additional time inquiring about
each patient's treatment goals.
For example, the podiatrist in
Hartman172 who failed to account for the patient's goal of wearing highheeled shoes would not only examine the patient and ask about her chief
complaint but, in response to her complaint about foot pain, he would
also ask how her foot pain is most affecting her home life, her work,
and her major activities outside of home and work. Depending on the
information he receives in response, the physician might also follow-up
with a few more questions designed to probe the answer to the initial
question. While the amount of time such an inquiry would take will
vary from case to case, it is likely that it would add only a few minutes
73
on average to the time physicians spend with each patient.'
The most obvious benefit to clinical efficiency that will result from
the rule of reasonable inquiry is the avoidance of the costs associated
with unnecessary medical care. 174 When a physician fails to appreciate
and account for a patient's treatment goals in the informed consent
process, the physician may recommend-and patients may consent to
and receive-treatments that are inconsistent with the patient's goals.
Redford and Hartman are clear examples of unnecessary medical care
resulting from physicians' failures to know or consider the goals of their
patients. Ms. Redford would not have undergone a hysterectomy and
Ms. Hartman would not have undergone her particular foot surgery had
either physician understood that those treatments could not possibly

171. See supra Part III.A (discussing the majority interpretation of a physician's duty to inquire under informed consent law).
172. Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206, 1207-08 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
173. On average, physicians spend I Ito 13 minutes with each patient. See K. Cole-Kelly et
al., Integrating the Family into Routine Patient Care:A QualitativeStudy, 47 J. FAM. PRAC. 440
(1998); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Preserving the Doctor-PatientRelationship in the Era of Managed
Care, JAMA, Jan, 25, 1995, at 323.
174. See generally Marcia Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254 JAMA 1203,
1203-07 (1985) (suggesting that physicians have a responsibility to ration unnecessary tests and
other procedures to curtail high medical costs); Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy:
Protecting Patientsfrom Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 302-04 (1994) (discussing
the physician's role in relation to himself, the patient, insurers, and society at large).
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achieve either patient's treatment goals. 175 Obviously, both time and
money were wasted on unwanted, elective surgeries.
The savings produced by the duty of reasonable inquiry are even
greater if one also considers the potential complications associated with
medical care and the additional costs that would be incurred if one or
more of those complications materialized. 176 In other words, when the
duty of reasonable inquiry eliminates the expense of an unnecessary
medical procedure, it not only saves the costs of a successful procedure
but potentially the much higher costs of an unsuccessful one.
A second benefit of the duty of reasonable inquiry, related to the
efficiency of lowering the incidence of unnecessary medical care, is the
reduction in frequency of sub-optimal medical care. Although a
misunderstanding between a patient and a physician about the patient's
treatment goals will occasionally lead to the provision of unnecessary
medical care, those misunderstandings likely result in sub-optimal
treatment much more frequently. A range of medical treatments exists
for any one patient, and each treatment can be placed on a continuum
beginning with the optimal treatment (the one that is most likely to
achieve the patient's treatment goals) to unnecessary medical care
(treatments that cannot possibly achieve the patient's treatment goals).
Sub-optimal treatments are all those that fall between the two extremes
on the continuum. They are treatments that can achieve the patient's
goals but do not have the best chance of doing so. A legal standard that
routinely permits physicians to assume a patient's treatment goals based
only on that patient's medical circumstances likely introduces some
degree of misunderstanding into the process of identifying, ranking and
explaining treatment options to patients. Such misunderstanding, in
turn, increases the risk that sub-optimal treatment will result. Because
the duty of reasonable inquiry works to minimize misunderstandings
about patients' treatment goals, it is likely to improve the efficiency of
medical care by not only lowering the risk that physicians will provide
unnecessary care, but also by increasing the likelihood that physicians
will provide the optimal treatment from among several options.
The hypothetical case of the colon cancer patient who wants to dance
at his daughter's wedding illustrates this point. Suppose that this

175. See Redford v. United States, No. Civ. A. 89-2324 (CRR), 1992 WL 84898, at *13 (D.
D.C. April 10, 1992) (holding liable doctors who did not consider patients' dual goals of reducing
pelvic pain and pregnancy); Hartman, 665 So. 2d at 1210 (holding doctor responsible for failing
to disclose information relevant to the patient's goal of wearing high heels again).
176. See Angell, supra note 174, at 1204 (noting that coronary artery surgery carries a 10%
risk of death or stroke even when provided unnecessarily).
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patient's physician did not know or inquire about the patient's treatment
goal and recommended a particular chemotherapy regimen based on its
likelihood in extending the patient's life as long as possible. Suppose
further that, even though the patient could attend his daughter's
wedding ceremony, the treatment had such significant side effects that it
prevented the patient from walking down the aisle with his daughter and
from attending the reception. Assume also that other treatments existed
that had a lesser chance of extending the patient's life but also carried
less severe side effects. The clinical inefficiency that results in this case
is not that the patient was provided unnecessary care but, rather, that the
patient received a treatment that was sub-optimal. In other words, a
better understanding of the patient's treatment goals would not have
changed the fact that the patient received one of the treatments from
those available to him; instead, it would have changed which treatment
option was chosen. The patient would have chosen the more valuable
treatment-the one that was most likely to achieve his goals.
A third improvement to clinical efficiency likely to result from a duty
of reasonable inquiry is that some patients will have healthier outcomes.
A physician who inquires into the treatment goals of each patient
necessarily involves the patient in developing a treatment plan more so
than a physician who inquires only into a patient's medical
circumstances. Moreover, studies of patient-physician relationships and
communication in the clinical setting reveal that patients who perceive
themselves as involved in designing their own treatment plans have
better health outcomes than other patients. 177 It stands to reason that a
patient who is more involved in planning a treatment regimen is also
more likely to faithfully carry out that regimen outside of the
physician's office and, therefore, more likely to have a healthier
outcome than are patients who are less involved in treatment planning.
A healthier outcome from a given treatment is, in economic terms, a
more efficient outcome.
Finally, the duty of reasonable inquiry is likely to improve clinical
efficiency by decreasing the chance that a patient will sue a physician
for medical malpractice. Studies also reveal that physicians who
communicate well with their patients are less likely to be sued by those
patients. 178 Specifically, patients are less likely to sue their physicians
177.

See COMMUNICATION AND HEALTH OUTCOMES chs. 3-5 (Gary L. Kreps & Dan O'Hair

eds., 1995) (considering the studies related to improved health outcomes and improved health
professional communication with patients); MOIRA STEWART, Studies of Health Outcomes and
Patient-Centered Communication, in PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICINE:
CLINICAL METHOD 185 (1995) (reviewing the results of 21 studies).
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178. See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship
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if they perceive that their physicians are attentive to their needs. 179 A
duty of reasonable inquiry improves communication between patients
and physicians and increases the attentiveness of physicians to the needs
of patients. Again, it stands to reason that a physician who asks about a
patient's particular treatment goals and who incorporates those goals
into the physician's assessment and explanation of that patient's
treatment options is more likely to be perceived by the patient as
attentive. Decreasing the risk of lawsuits promotes clinical efficiency
because it decreases the risk that physicians will pay on judgments, or
lose clinical time or jeopardize their reputations defending a lawsuit.
In the end, the duty of reasonable inquiry would likely result in a net
gain in clinical efficiency as compared to the clinical effect of current
disclosure standards. The increase in clinical time spent on informed
consent would likely be more than offset by the efficiencies described
above. Thus, there is reason to recognize a duty of reasonable inquiry
even on the grounds of clinical efficiency alone.
D. Exceptional Cases in Which the Rule of Reasonable Inquiry Does
Not Apply
There are exceptional cases in which the duty of reasonable inquiry
should not apply. These are cases in which all of the following are true:
(1) the patient's treatment choices are few, (2) the health risks of and
outcomes likely to result from those treatments vary little in degree or in
kind, and (3) there is almost no risk of a grave consequence, such as
death or a permanent disability. So, for example, the duty of reasonable
inquiry would not apply to a physician providing treatment information
to a patient presenting with a non-compound fracture of a bone. The
patient has essentially no option other than to allow the fracture to heal;
what choices the patient has (e.g., the method of immobilization used)

with Malpractice Claims Among Primary CarePhysicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 556-59
(1997) and studies cited therein at nn.6-12. Among other things, Levinson et al. found that the
length of time a primary care physician spent with each patient was a reliable predictor of
whether the physician had or had not been sued for malpractice in the past. See id. at 558 (noting
that routine visits among no-claims physicians were on average 3.3 minutes longer than were
those among physicians with past claims). This finding supports the argument that the extra time
routinely spent on inquiring into the treatment goals of patients will lower the risk of patient lawsuits. Importantly, several studies have found that the risk of being sued for malpractice increases
when patients perceive that their values are not being respected by their physicians. See id. at
1619 and studies cited therein at nn.7-1 1.
179. See id. at 553, 558 (noting that primary care physicians who had no medical malpractice
claims history were more likely to orient patients to the process and order of their visit, to encourage patients to talk through "active listening" techniques, and to express friendliness and warmth
by employing humor).
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pose very similar risks and benefits; and there is no real chance of death
or permanent disability in the case. In such exceptional cases, the law
should permit physicians to determine what information to disclose to
patients based only on the patient's medical condition.
This description of exceptional cases in which the duty of reasonable
inquiry would not apply finds support in a 1994 editorial in the New
England Journal of Medicine by its then editor-in-chief, Jerome P.
Kassirer. 180 Dr. Kassirer argued for an expanded recognition of clinical
circumstances in which the preferences of individual patients are
paramount in identifying a "recommended" treatment, describing those
clinical circumstances as follows:
(1) when there are major differences in the kinds of possible outcomes
(for example, death versus disability); (2) when there are major
differences between treatments in the likelihood and impact of
complications; (3) when choices involve trade-offs between near-term
and long-term outcomes; (4) when one of the choices can result in a
small chance of a grave outcome; (5) when the apparent difference
between options is marginal; (6) when a patient is particularly averse
to taking risks; and (7) when
a patient attaches unusual importance to
18 1
certain possible outcomes.
Recognizing exceptional cases in which the duty of reasonable
inquiry does not apply is necessary because cases exist in which the
patient's medical condition almost completely dictates what options a
patient has and the relative merits of those options. Accordingly, there
is little to be gained in those cases by requiring physicians to inquire
into the patient's treatment goals. Such an inquiry would not alter the
treatment options disclosed by the physician or the way in which the
physician described the risks and benefits of those options. In other
words, the patient's autonomy in choosing a treatment option would not
be meaningfully enhanced by anything other than a medical inquiry.
Thus, to avoid encouraging a wasteful use of physician time, the law
should recognize the exceptional case in which the duty of reasonable
inquiry does not apply.

180. See Jerome P. Kassirer, IncorporatingPatients' Preferences into Medical Decisions, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1895 (1994).
181. Id. at 1896 (internal citations omitted). For suggestions that the entire duty of disclosure
be varied depending upon clinical circumstances, see Jay Katz, Physician-Patient Encounters
"On a Darkling Plain," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 207, 221-223 (1987); Schuck, supra note 17, at
951-56.
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E. IncreasingPatient Trust in the Era of Medical Cost Containment
With the Duty of Reasonable Inquiry
A final justification for the duty of reasonable inquiry is that it can
help restore public trust in physicians, which has eroded with the rise of
managed care. 182 Public trust in physicians and in the health care
delivery system is low, 183 and market pressures to lower
the cost of
184
problem.
the
of
part
are
care
medical
and
insurance
health
No system of health care can survive without public trust. 185 Public
trust in physicians and in the health care system is essential to the
public's health. 186 Without it, individuals will resort to self-treatment,
seek treatment outside of the system, or delay treatment within the
system. 187 Those who do not trust physicians or the system in which

182. "Managed Care" generally refers to "organizational arrangements that seek to alter
treatment practices so that care of acceptable quality can be provided at lower cost." David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger. The Impact of Managed Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care
and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693, 1694 (1996); see also John K. Iglehart, Physiciansand
the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1167, 1167 (1994) (noting that a managed
care organization is any system "that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing and delivery of
medical care through contracts with selected physicians and hospitals that provide comprehensive
health care services to enrolled members for a predetermined monthly premium"). Yet, a system
of health care delivery need not fit this definition to employ cost containment mechanisms commonly associated with managed care. See Wolf, supra note 19, at 1633 n.13.
183. A recent Harris poll reported only a 39% public confidence rating of the institution of
medicine. Although this represents an improvement over the all-time low of 22% recorded in
1993, it is a full 34% drop in public confidence toward medicine since 1966, which includes a 4%
drop since 1984. See Harris Poll: Public Confidence in Medicine Up, HEALTH LINE (Feb. 3,
1999); see also Robert J. Blendon et al., Bridging the Gap Between Expert and Public Views on
Health Care Reform, 269 JAMA 2573, 2575-76 (1993) (noting that public confidence in medicine as an institution dropped 50 percentage points between 1966 and 1993, including drop of 20
percentage points between 1985 and 1993 alone).
184. See Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and
Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1641 (1998) (reporting results of an empirical study, which showed that
patients whose physicians are paid under a managed care plan are significantly less likely to completely or even mostly trust that their physicians will place the patient's needs ahead of limiting
the cost of health care provided to the patient); see also Managed Care: PatientsLose Confidence
When Doctors Block Referrals, CHI. TRIB., July 26, 1999, Evening Update Edition, at 7 (noting
that while the vast majority of elderly Californians are pleased with their own primary care physicians, those who experienced difficulty in getting a referral were nearly three times as likely to
report feeling a low degree of trust towards their primary care physicians); see generally Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 182 (discussing the new managed care dynamic and its effect
on patient-physician relations).
185. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 182, at 1693-94.
186. See id. at 1696-97.
187. See Marilyn Marchione, Don't Let Market Manipulate Trust in Your Doctor,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1998, Health and Science, at I (attributing some of the rise in
use of alternative medicine among Americans to the public's dissatisfaction with and distrust of
their physicians acting within a managed care environment); see also DAN BEAUCHAMP, THE
HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC 235-89 (1988) (explaining the necessity of public trust in the confi-
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physicians practice are unlikely to seek treatment unless they are sick
and, thus, opportunities to prevent illness will be lost. Even when sick,
a distrusting person may exhaust all other options before submitting to
the health care system, giving diseases and injuries the opportunity to
progress and fester before a meaningful effort is made to restore health.
Ultimately, medicine will not be as successful in restoring health if it
systematically discourages those in need of medical care from seeking
that care earlier rather than later.
Public trust in the health care system is impossible without public
trust in physicians. 188 Physicians are the direct medical care providers.
Patients' trust in physicians is diminished unless patients believe that
their physicians are not only technically proficient, but also personally
caring. 189 Patient trust in physicians involves a belief not only that
physicians are personally concerned about their patients, but, more
specifically, "that physicians place the well-being of their patients
above all other interests-a belief in the fidelity of physicians to the
interests of their patients."'" The current health care system, which is
designed to lower the cost of medical care by placing each physician's
financial interests in tension with the medical needs of his or her
patients, undermines this trust.
In the name of lowering the cost of medical care, health care delivery
systems have changed the nature of patient-physician relationships.
They have increased the role of physicians as medicine's gatekeepers
1 91
and, thereby, decreased the role of physicians as patient advocates.
For example, medical care plans routinely employ pre-paid, capitated
payment systems for paying physicians who provide care to member
patients. Under such a payment method, a primary care physician
receives a monthly sum from the plan for each plan member who has
elected to receive care from that physician. The physician receives this
payment before providing any medical care to any plan member and
without knowing how much medical care each plan member will need
dentiality of the medical system for public health measures to succeed in preventing an AIDS
epidemic).
188. For a description of the relationship between interpersonal trust in individual physicianpatient relationships and social trust in an entire system of medical care, see Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 182, at 1693-94.
189. See id. at 1693.
190. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Patient-Physician Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV.
1091, 1100 (1999).
191. For discussion of the tension between physicians as patient advocates and physicians as
stewards of medical resources, see Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 182, at 1693-96; William
M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1534 (1999).
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during the month. If the cost of the medical care provided by the
physician to plan members exceeds the pre-paid amount, the physician
loses money. If, however, the cost of medical care is less than the prepaid amount, then the physician makes money. 192 Although such a
payment plan creates an incentive for physicians to be wise stewards of
medical resources, it also creates an incentive for physicians to withhold
medical care that a patient might need so as to increase personal profit
or decrease personal financial loss. 193 Such an incentive necessarily
undermines trust in the fidelity of physicians to the needs of their
patients. 194
Because the health care system strains the public's trust of
physicians, enforcing a duty of reasonable inquiry is particularly
appropriate. Although such a legal duty cannot completely restore
public trust in physicians, it can contribute to that effort. In requiring
physicians to both inquire about the treatment goals of each patient they
propose to treat and account for those goals in formulating,
recommending and explaining treatment options to patients, the law can
directly address public concern over physician disloyalty to patients.
The duty of reasonable inquiry would require physicians to give a
heightened priority to the interests of each patient in creating a
treatment plan, and, when an injury results because a physician fails to
do so, it would impose liability. Such a rule of liability is valuable
because it creates a climate in which patient trust can flourish. 195 It
steers physicians toward conduct that can inspire the public to trust
physicians as patient advocates within a managed care medical system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The law should recognize the duty of physicians to reasonably
inquire about the subjective treatment goals of patients. Informed

192. See generally Iglehart, supra note 182 (discussing the financial structure of managed care
systems); Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 182 (discussing the effect of managed care upon
patient-physician relations).
193. See Steven Z. Pantilat et al., Effect of Incentives on the Use of Indicated Services in
Managed Care, 170 W. J. MED. 137 (1999) (noting that compared to fee-for-service incentives,
managed care incentives associated with utilization review and capitation resulted in physicians
ordering 3% to 11% less medical care).
194. See M. Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 279 (1993);
Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604, 604-06 (1995) (discussing the impact of managed care organizations on physician and patient decisions).
195. See Annette C. Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS
95, 111 (1994). Baier states, "Social artifices such as property, which allocate rights and duties as
a standard job does, more generally also create a climate of trust, a presumption of a sort of trustworthiness." Id. at 111.
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consent disclosure standards have been able to accommodate such a
duty for at least the last twenty-five years. Additionally, principles of
autonomy and justice favor enforcing a duty of reasonable inquiry. The
duty promotes greater patient autonomy in medical decision-making
because it requires physicians to take greater account of the subjective
informational needs of patients. It is also fair to physicians because it is
limited to a reasonable pursuit of patients' treatment goals and does not
require the discovery of a patient's every idiosyncrasy. Moreover, the
demand on the clinical time of health care professionals to fulfill the
duty is likely offset by an increase in patient health, as well as a
decrease in the incidence of unnecessary care and patient lawsuits.
Despite the benefits offered by a duty of reasonable inquiry, courts
have failed to enforce such a duty and instead require only that
physicians learn the medical circumstances of their patients. As a
result, the law permits physicians to assume that patients with the same
medical condition also have the same need for treatment information
when choosing a treatment plan.
Recent erosion of public trust in physicians during the era of
managed health care also justifies the duty for reasonable inquiry. By
requiring physicians to inquire about and account for each patient's
treatment goals, the duty can help restore public confidence in the
fidelity of physicians to their patient's interests.
In the end, a principle of promoting a health care system that respects
patients justifies the duty of reasonable inquiry into the subjective
treatment goals of patients. This principle is the common thread that
runs through each of the arguments in favor of imposing this duty. A
duty for physicians to attempt to learn each patient's unique purposes
for seeking treatment promotes greater respect for patients because it
enhances their ability to make more autonomous treatment decisions; it
also protects patients from unnecessary medical care and directs them to
optimal treatments; and it helps create a partnership between patients
and physicians that fosters collaborative treatment planning and
encourages patient trust through physician loyalty.

